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INTRODUCTION
   Negotiating skills are one key facet of the multifaceted art of diplomacy. 
Scholarly studies of Japanese and other national negotiating "styles" rest on 
three basic arguments : first, that a particular country's diplomatic representa-
tive's style of negotiating is identifiable ; that these identifiable negotiating 
styles differ ; and, third, that these identifiable, country-specific styles signifi-
cantly affect negotiating outcomes. 
   While particular bargaining moves are not unique to any country, the mix of 
moves provides a distinctive composite portrait for any country's diplomatic 
behavior. Japan is no exception, Enough has been written by Japanese and other 
analysts to permit one to offer a portrait of the Japanese style of negotiation. 
The behavior-what may be labeled "coping"-is consistently evident both at 
the loftier plateau of diplomacy and down in the trenches at the level of direct 
negotiations.' 
   "Coping" captures the go-with-the-flow essence of the Japanese bargaining 
approach : cautiously appraising the external situation, methodically weighing 
and sorting each and every option, deferring action on contentious issues, craft-
ing a domestic consensus on the situation faced, making minimal adjustments or 
concessions in order to block, circumvent or dissolve criticism, and adapting to 
a situation with minimum risk. This negotiating style mirrors the vaunted low-
key, low-profile, risk-minimizing, defensive, damage-limiting, patterns in 
Japan's overall foreign relations conduct. 
   Ever since Commodore Matthew Perry's "black ships" sailed into Edo Bay in 
1853, piercing the curtain of Japan's centuries of virtual isolation from the 
outside world, matters of diplomatic negotiations have divided the nation and 
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stirred controversy and crisis among its leaders. Japanese newspapers have 
scrutinized in microscopic detail any topic or official decision relating to the 
government's handling of negotiations. Japanese leaders have regarded diplo-
macy and diplomatic negotiations as formidable, face-threatening undertakings. 
They have trod warily when diplomatic problems lead to the negotiating table. 
The Japanese themselves dwell upon the hardships and complexities of dip-
lomatic negotiations. Most Japanese today would no doubt still agree with a 
remark made by Okubo Toshimichi over a century ago. "Dealing with foreign-
ers," the Meiji-era statesman observed, "can be a troublesome and difficult task."
   Drawing from the extensive literature on the topic, the following list sets 
forth the "Top Ten" characteristics of Japanese bargaining behavior.
 1. Use of vague, ambiguous, noncommittal language in framing Japanese 
   negotiating proposals ; 
2. Heavy stress on process-related elements of negotiation (e. g., person-to-
   person communication, back-channel contacts) ; 
3. Few initiatives, especially an political, security, and controversial 
   economic topics ; 
4. Avoidance of front-line, assertive, visible, leadership positions and roles ; 
5. Slowness in reaching negotiating positions, after lengthy deliberations 
   among domestic interests affected by subject(s) to be discussed ; 
6. Preference for adaptive, short-range, ad-hoc, case-by-case approaches 
   over comprehensive, integrated plans ; 
7. Preference for bridging, mediating, go-between role when faced with 
   highly adversarial situations ; 
8. Concessions presented slowly, in small increments ; 
9. Significant compromises offered only when conditions have become 
   highly politicized and a "crisis" stage has been reached ; and 
10. Relatively great weight given to instruments bolstering commitment to 
   Japanese positions as against arguments and techniques to persuade or 
   convince others to change their views or positions.
   Based on the sheer consistency of these and other traits over time, Japanese 
negotiating style has lent itself to a variety of characterizations. "Probe, push, 
panic, and postpone" is one. "Silence, smiling, and sleeping" is another. "Deny, 
delay, dare, deadlock, and discontinue" could be yet another. While uncomfort-
able with the rather mocking tone of such descriptions, few Japanese analysts 
have disputed their general accuracy in portraying the behavior of Japanese
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negotiators. 
Factors Shaping "Japanese" Negotiating Style 
   Attitudes, psychological and cultural traits.' Most relevant to Japan's nego-
tiating style is a core of beliefs widely shared among Japanese-notably an 
uneasiness toward the outside world, an ultra-sensitivity to foreign opinions and 
criticism, plus a near-obsessive concern, with Japan's weakness and vulnera-
bility. 
   Such verities are less than eternal and at best have loose connections to 
observable behavior in international negotiations. Could the much-vaunted, 
culturally-rooted precept of "wa." ("harmony") tell us why Japanese negotiators 
have stood firmly against compromise on the Northern Islands for nearly half a 
century? Are not other countries' government officials just as inclined as 
Tokyo's to keeping their "true feelings" ("honne") to themselves when they 
deliver official statements for public consumption? 
   Political Institutions and Processes. In addressing government-to-
government negotiating behavior, variables relating to domestic Japanese 
political processes, institutions, and decision-making exert a direct, significant, 
and demonstrable impact upon visible behavior. Japan is a highly pluralistic 
society. Reaching public policy decisions is an intensely combative, heavily 
bureaucratized, consensus-driven process of accommodating diverse interests 
and viewpoints. Typically, negotiating decisions are reached ("arranged" is the 
preferred term) from the bottom-up, via informal, give-and-take, consensus-
based processes stressing personal relationships and networks. 
   A Second-Tier Power in a Defensive Position. In addition to the direct and 
indirect impact of domestic political structures and processes, Japanese nego-
tiating style is heavily conditioned by Japan's position as a secondary or second-
tier power in global affairs. Japan's rapid postwar economic growth raised 
foreign expectations that Japan could, would, and should play an enlarged 
international role. These expectations turned into demands during the late 
1970s and 1980s that Japan act in ways thought commensurate with its 
economic superpower status. 
   Beginning in the Occupation era, the pattern of Japanese defensive, reactive, 
minimalist diplomacy was established, and made sense at the time. After all, 
what choice did Japanese officials have? When asked to "jump," they would 
reply, "How far?" When asked "What does Japan want to do?," they would 
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answer, "What do you want us to do?"
   Throughout the postwar era, Japanese representatives have negotiated with 
foreign counterparts who have asked Japan to do more, to take action, to 
participate more actively, to compromise, or face the consequences. Faced with 
such demands, the Japanese side has sought to limit, avoid, circumvent, weaken, 
blunt, or reduce the level of these demands. Typically, Japan's negotiators have 
worked from a borrowed or reflected bargaining agenda-an imported wish-list 
drawn up by other governments. This study emphasizes the impact of Japan's 
defensive position in negotiations. 
   The analytical difficulty of rating the effectiveness of the Japanese 
bargaining approach is highlighted in negotiations to open Japan's domestic 
market to foreign-grown rice. Over seven long years, the Japanese government 
resisted foreign demands to sell rice in Japan. Japanese negotiating behavior 
was quintessentially "Japanese" on rice. Moving from an adamant "not a single 
grain of foreign rice will enter Japan" position, the Japanese side gradually 
succumbed to a combination of American and GATT-centered multilateral 
pressure, finally accepting a "minimum access" or "partial access" formula for 
step-by-step increases in Japanese rice imports. Was the final outcome a 
Japanese bargaining victory? Was it a defeat? Objectively, the Japanese gov-
ernment had conceded in principle but had compromised only a little on 
substance. At bottom, when the dust had settled, the much-maligned Japanese 
"4 P's" or "5 D's" approach seemed to have worked.
   Or had it? If Japan's core concern is averting or containing foreign criticism, 
then its negotiating "victory" on rice was outweighed by its obvious "defeat" in 
the ongoing battle to dodge foreign flak. Just as Japan's whopping $13 billion 
contribution to the U. S.-led forces in the Persian Gulf was lost in the wave of 
anti-Japanese criticism of Tokyo's reluctant, "too little, too late" response, 
Japan's stubbornness to budge an the rice issue invited heavy, and probably 
lasting, foreign resentment and criticism.
   No matter whether one rates Japanese negotiating performance positively or 
negatively it is interesting that the behavior is capable of such sharply divergent 
interpretations. Tokyo University political scientist Inoguchi Takashi labels Jap-
anese diplomacy as "iridescent" ("tamamushiiro").3 It is this iridescence which 
enables observers to see what they choose to see to interpret the behavior in 
wars they prefer, depending on their mood swings or endorphin level at a given 
moment.
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   In assessing Japanese negotiating behavior and performance, this study 
seeks to define Japanese objectives. After all, should not Japanese negotiators be 
judged on the basis of Japanese goals? While this may seem an obvious point, it 
is not, because Japanese goals are typically opaque and therefore must be 
inferred from behavior. Moreover, as mentioned above, Japan is typically the 
defensive side in negotiations and the Japanese side deals with an imported 
agenda. Also, even though Japanese negotiators often draw criticism for failing 
to take initiatives, to articulate Japanese positions clearly, to assume political 
risks, or to respond quickly to changes in the bargaining situation, one may well 
ask whether or not the Japanese were interested in such matters at all. 
Identifying Japan's "medium of exchange" is therefore critical to grasping 
correctly the Japanese style 
                 THE RICE NEGOTIATIONS 
The Subject of Rice 
   For Japan, rice is a near-sacred product. Deeply embedded in Japanese 
history, culture, economics, politics, and symbolism. For the Japanese, rice is 
"our Christmas tree
," and rice-producing land is reverently called "our holy 
land." In Japanese eyes, rice-far more than beef, citrus fruit, or textiles-
represented the ultimate non-negotiable market-access topic. "Not a single 
grain of foreign rice shall ever enter Japan," was the solemn vow of Japanese 
politicians of all stripes, backed by public opinion, the press, the business com-
munity, academics, and the bureaucracy. Opposition to imported rice reflected a 
national consensus. 
   Small wonder that American demands in 1986 for opening the Japanese rice 
market were seen as a frontal assault on Japanese culture itself. There is some 
irony in the Americans criticizing Japan's inefficient rice-farming system. After 
all, it was the American-led Occupation which had broken up existing large 
land-holdings into the small tracts that would become the bastions of rice 
farmers whose votes politicians rewarded with generous subsidies perpetuating 
these economically inefficient plots. 
Preliminary Phase 
   US pressure on Japan to open its rice market to a foreign rice began with the 
US complaint in 1986 that Japanese restrictions on imports of 12 agricultural 
products, including rice, were in violation of GATT rules. The US complaint 
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stemmed from prodding from a well-organized American lobbying group, the 
Rice Millers Association (RMA).4 Over seven years would pass, and six prime 
ministers would hold office, before a negotiated settlement was reached in 
December 1993. 
   The Japanese goal on the issue of rice imports was simple : keep foreign rice 
from Japanese mouths. On an opposition-to-liberalization scale of one to ten, 
with oranges rating a "3" and beef about a "5", rice would have registered a 
perfect "10." Along with the heavy value Japanese attached to the subject was 
the virtually universal Japanese perception of domestic rice market as sacro-
sanct. Permitting foreign rice to enter Japan was tantamount to letting foreign 
firms build condos inside the walls of the Imperial Palace. The Japanese re-
sponse to American demands for opening the domestic market was akin to "how 
dare you! " 
   During the pre-negotiating period on rice, Japan's basic objective was 
negative, to block entirely the subject from being placed on the bargaining 
agenda, at either the bilateral or the multilateral GATT level. Once the RMA's 
petition was filed, and USTR Clayton Yeutter had to decide how to deal with the 
petition, Tokyo unleashed a defensive counterattack with every weapon at its 
disposal.' Both houses of the Diet voted unanimously in favor of a resolution 
binding Japan to self-sufficiency in rice production. Politicians, the press, big 
business, academic experts, and of course farm lobby groups voiced a single 
message : "no" on rice imports. In order to communicate this resolve to the 
Americans-to make Washington "understand" the Japanese situation and not 
to press rice liberalization upon Japan-letters were sent, envoys were dis-
patched, meetings were arranged, and demonstrations were organized. 
"The List" Japanese Arguments Ag
ainst Rice Imports 
   Among the long list of reasons cited in support of the Japanese position in 
the various pre-bargaining communications to the American side were the 
following : 
   • the historical significance of rice in Japan ; 
   • the cultural significance of rice to Japan ; 
   • other countries also award preferential treatment to certain economic 
     sectors ; 
   • Japan is the world's top importer of foreign agricultural products ; 
   • Japan's National Food Control Law establishes rice as a "basic food" and 
     self-sufficiency in rice as essential to national security interests ; 
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• The Japanese Diet will never accept rice liberalization ; 
• The Japanese public will not accept rice liberalization ; 
• Japan's situation on rice is "unique," "special," and "different"; 
• If Japan is forced to import rice, Japanese-American relations will suffer ; 
• Rice is a domestic issue of no concern to other countries ; 
• Japan needs more time to consider the subject, so other governments 
 should be "patient"; and 
• Rice liberalization is not a bilateral but a multilateral subject.
   Arguably, presentation of two of the above reasons proved to be a mistake 
for the Japanese in their preliminary jousting on the issue. When negotiations 
on the subject subsequently switched the multilateral level, Tokyo rejected the 
idea of liberalization because, for Japan, rice (unlike steak and oranges, a staple 
of the Japanese everyday diet) was a basic food. Japan's multilateral-level 
approach was to seek an exception for Japan's rice producing sector. 
   In 1988, with a second Rice Millers' petition under consideration at USTR, 
Ambassador Matsunaga met Yeutter. In that conversation, after urging Yeutter 
to reject the petition, Matsunaga communicated Japan's willingness to include 
rice an the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda. Based on the Ambassador's 
assurance, Yeutter turned down the RMA request,' on the condition that Japan 
deliver on its stated commitment by addressing the issue multilaterally.
   As Yeutter was putting the Japanese commitment on public record, 
multilateral pressures were beginning to build on Japan. In October, 1988, the 
"Keynes Group" at the Urugua
y Round asked far "minimum access" for imported 
rice into Japan. In December, Japan assembled a mammoth delegation to the 
Uruguay Round negotiations in Montreal, including a bloated "oendan" of party 
politicians attending, as is typical for Japanese multilateral delegations, to gain 
information, to score political points by having been at the scene, to demonstrate 
commitment to the Japanese cause in the negotiations, and, perhaps, to keep a 
watchful eye on Japanese bureaucrats in the event they might be inclined to 
compromise excessively.
   By the Montreal meetings, Japan had crossed the line : Tokyo was on record 
as supporting the liberalization of agricultural products and was irreversibly 
enmeshed in the negotiating process. There would be no turning back.
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Communication Static and Shifting Goal Posts 
   During the course of the 1988 US-Japan negotiations over renewal of the 
beef and citrus fruit agreement, Yeutter had told Japanese Minister of Agri-
culture Sato Takashi that the US would not press Japan bilaterally to liberalize 
its rice market. Rice, to Japanese the dreaded "r" word, was taken by Tokyo 
officials as off-limits in at the bilateral level, according to this mutual 
understanding. 
   Also important, in Japanese eyes, was Agriculture Secretary Richard E. 
Lyng's statement later that year that the US would be willing to accept a 
percentage-based "partial access" (bubun kaiho) arrangement for Japanese rice 
imports.? Through the summer of 1990, in fact, the heated Japanese domestic 
political debate over the rice question was based upon this understanding, 
namely, that the Americans would allow the issue to be addressed at the GATT 
an the basis of "partial access"-a gradual opening of Japan's rice market-
without tariffication. 
   Not surprisingly, in light of this belief, Japanese officials were jolted in mid-
1990 when Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence R. Eagleburger informed the 
Japanese that "partial access" would not satisfy Washington but, instead, tarif-
fication of rice imports would be required.' Overnight, the rug had been yanked 
from under Japanese assumptions as to what type of Japanese compromise on 
rice would be necessary to meet American desires. 
   Throughout the rice negotiations, but especially after this shift in US 
expectations, Japanese bargaining behavior was finely attuned to, and directly 
shaped by, American policies, American officials' statements, as well as by 
Japanese interpretations of the meaning behind explicit and implicit American 
positions taken an the rice issue.' 
   One element in Japan's defensive bargaining strategy was active 
involvement in negotiations on the issue at the multilateral level. Tokyo's 
multilateral-ization of the rice import question no doubt stemmed from a 
conviction that action could be thereby avoided, given the GATT's impoverished 
past record in reining in protection-minded governments. As they conducted a 
holding pattern at the Uruguay Round, Japanese officials concentrated their 
focus on the real target, the United States government. Consistently, the 
Japanese goal was to ferret out by whatever means at their disposal what the 
Americans meant by their proposals, what they expected, and what minimum 
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level of Japanese rice-related concessions they would accept. 
Middle Phase : To the Brink of Compromise and Back 
   Miyazawa Kiichi became prime minister in November 1991. He quickly 
assigned top priority to working toward successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round. His personal commitment to that process, however, did not imply that he 
supported rice imports based on a tariffication formula. The most likely 
explanation was that his Liberal Democratic Party had lost its majority in the 
upper house of the Japanese Diet in mid-year elections. Tariffication of rice 
imports would mean revising the Food Control Law. Upper house approval 
would be required for revising the Law. Thus, as the prime minister told 
Secretary of State James Baker in Tokyo that month, "it's impossible to accept 
tariffication-based rice imports, because that would require revising the Food 
Control Law." io
   Japan's negotiating stance thus shifted ("kome shifuto") with Miyazawa's 
assuming office. Now it was focused on locating areas of possible Japanese 
compromise without changing the Food Control Law. Miyazawa, anticipating 
release of the GATT Secretary General's draft proposal (the "Dunkel Paper") on 
December 20, sent former Ambassador to the US Matsunaga Nobuo to sound out 
the American side. Among others, Matsunaga met Brent Snowcroft, who ex-
pressed firmly to the envoy the American hard-line "no exceptions on tarif-
fication" position on the issue." 
   As it happened, the Dunkel proposal fell short of gaining enough support to 
succeed in Geneva. But the presentation of the 450-page Dunkel "take it or leave 
it" proposal-with its "no exceptions" prohibition against special treatment for 
any nation's domestic agricultural sector-forced the Japanese government to 
confront the issue of liberalization. With Tokyo now prepared to deal seriously 
with the rice import issue, the presentation of Dunkel's document marked the 
beginning of the middle-phase of the process of bargaining on the subject. 
   The Dunkel proposal also hardened the American side's "no exceptions" 
position and shaped the approach it would adopt in discussions on the issue 
during the ensuing year. American officials began what would later become a 
chorus of criticism aimed at Japanese "intransigence" that threatened to derail 
the Uruguay Round process. 
   Japan's early-1992 response to the Dunkel draft had raised the hackles of 
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American negotiators, for the document excluded rice tariffication entirely. In 
light of the hostile US reception to the Japanese proposal, Miyazawa directed 
Gaimusho and Agriculture Ministry officials to work out a policy plan that 
would be acceptable to the US and would not require changing the Food Control 
Law. Operating under these two general guidelines, Foreign Ministry bureau-
crats prepared several drafts but Agriculture Ministry officials defiantly planted 
their feet against any compromise. One impassioned agriculture bureaucrat 
even invoked the fighting spirit of those stalwart defenders of Edo against a 
rebel forces over a century before : "We are the white tiger battalion. We'll fight 
to the death. It's the only way we can survive." 12
   A frustrated Miyazawa then summoned Owada Hisashi and Hamaguchi 
Yoshiharu, respectively the top-ranking career officials in the foreign and 
agriculture ministries " to talk" about the rice problem. Owada was willing to 
discuss the topic during the meeting, but Hamaguchi was not, because he 
considered management of the Food Control Law to be the Agriculture Min-
istry's responsibility."
The Agriculture Ministry Softens its Stance 
   Ministry of Agriculture intransigence softened in July 1992, with the 
appointment of Kyotani Akio as administrative vice-minister. Four years 
before, Kyotani, as Livestock Production Bureau Chief, had participated in the 
beef and citrus negotiations with the United States. He favored liberalization. A 
highly influential official, Kyotani was revered by his bureaucratic brethren in 
the Ministry. Why? Kyotani had a particular gift, a personal quality much 
prized in Japanese officialdom, the ability "to respond to the situation correctly" 
(jokyo ni tekikaku ni taio dekiru).14 
   In the fall of 1992, Kyotani warned a group of Liberal Democratic party 
agriculture group members that negotiations with the United States would "go 
nowhere" unless Japan was prepared to "set forth specific numbers," According 
to a later newspaper account of the meeting, Kyotani asked the politicians to 
"give me the responsibility to handle this."" Reading between the lines, the 
Japanese side, and even Agriculture Ministry officials, were now willing to use 
the "t" word (tariffication) as well as the dreaded "r" word in policy planning for 
the negotiations. From the Ministry of Agriculture's perspective the shift was 
extraordinary. After all, until just a few years before, no official interested in 
long-term employment at the Ministry would have dared utter the "r" word, 
much less discuss the idea of tariffication. Thus, Japan's one-dimensional "we 
won't accept tariffication" approach had now changed.
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   Shortly thereafter, Agriculture officials started sounding out the American 
side on possible tariffication of wheat and dairy products. Apparently, the idea 
was that by accepting tariff-based arrangements on these two lesser items., the 
Japanese side could then pull their wagons in a circle to protect the main issue-
rice imports.
   Moreover, several influential Liberal Democratic Party agriculture-issue 
group (zoku) members had been working behind the scenes to orchestrate a way 
for Miyazawa to be able to reach a politically viable decision on rice imparts. 
This trio of conservative politicians-Okawara Taichiro, Kato Koichi, and 
Yamamoto Tomio-had enough clout, earned by years of experience dealing 
with farm-related problems, for them to risk the wrath of farmers' groups and 
Agriculture Ministry bureaucrats by raising the possibility of opening Japan's 
rice market.
   In December 1992, at a press conference after his cabinet was reshuffled, 
Miyazawa hinted at the softening of Japan's negotiating stance : "we don't want 
to ruin the [Uruguay Round] negotiations and yet we don't want to ruin rice 
farming in Japan, how can we satisfy both goals? " 16 Miyazawa's impromptu 
remarks (not included in the press conference briefing materials aides had 
prepared) were taken to mean the Japanese side was on the brink of compromise 
on rice. According to insiders' accounts published in the press," Miyazawa had 
reached the conclusion that tarifficatian was "unavoidable" ("yamu o ezu").
   Behind Miyazawa's significant statement was that Japan had found itself in 
an untenable position in the multilateral negotiations. As long as the EC and the 
US remained at loggerheads on agricultural imports, Japanese leaders seemed 
quite content merely to watch from the sidelines, to let others take the heat for 
continued deadlock and the blame if the Uruguay Round talks collapsed. But the 
United States and the EC had announced an agreement on November 24. 
Miyazawa evidently was amazed that the French, who "disliked" the Americans, 
could have buckled under to Washington on the agricultural issue." 
   In addition, Washington was pressuring Tokyo strongly to open its rice 
market by the end of 1992. Japan's Agriculture and Fisheries Minister, Tanabu 
Makoto, had visited Washington to meet USTR Carla Hills and others to probe 
how firmly American trade officials were committed to the "no exceptions" 
stance. Finding the US to be quite firmly committed, Tanabu returned to Tokyo 
where he reported his assessment to Miyazawa. At about the same time, 
Miyazawa received a report on the multilateral situation from two of his party's
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leading agricultural affairs politicians, Okawara Taichiro and Hori Kosuke, who 
had just arrived back in Tokyo from Geneva. In addition, Miyazawa heard from 
his close friend Matsunaga that a settlement was imminent in Geneva."
   Based on information from these sources, Miyazawa was now prepared to 
take decisive action on the rice problem, Anticipating a US-EC accommodation 
in December 1992, which would have isolated Japan as the lone holdout on 
agricultural imports, the Miyazawa government, backed by ranking agricultural 
Diet members in his party and top Agriculture Ministry bureaucrats-was ready 
-however reluctantly-to compromise on the rice issue.
   As it happened, however, and fortunately for the Japanese side, the EC-US 
confrontation had not ended but continued to persist, giving Tokyo a respite, at 
least until the new Clinton Administration took office in January. Miyazawa's 
earlier readiness to compromise on rice imports, albeit at the final hour, as well 
as his subsequent readiness to postpone taking action on the issue, underline the 
extent to which the Japanese side's position varied according to fluctuations in 
US policy and in circumstances at Geneva.
   Japanese leaders were troubled by several future repercussions if Japan 
maintained its uncompromising posture on rice imports : the possibility Japan 
would "become isolated" ("koritsuka") at the Uruguay Round ; the likelihood that 
Japan would become the scapegoat if the negotiations were to fail ; and the 
chance that the US might retaliate in some fashion, threatening other Japanese 
economic sectors and even the stability of the Japanese American relationship 
itself. These were not far-fetched concerns ; they seemed based on an accurate 
assessment of actual conditions at the multilateral level and of repeatedly 
expressed American expectations of Japan.
   These factors gradually increased in significance during the middle-phase 
of negotiations on rice, raising the pressure an Japan's negotiators to compro-
mise. These same factors, over time, helped to splinter the once-unanimous 
Japanese domestic consensus against rice imports.
   By 1992, the once impregnable dike against imported rice was about to give 
way. Only the party politicians from rural districts and Agriculture Ministry 
bureaucrats still had fingers in the dike. As happened during the earlier orange 
negotiations, the bureaucrats at Agriculture proved themselves ahead of the 
politicians in accepting the need for compromise. Ministry officials thus turned
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willing, even eager, to have the ministry negotiate the best deal possible under 
the circumstances. Once the ministerial fingers were pulled from the dike, the 
vote-conscious politicians surrendered, permitting Agriculture bureaucrats 
negotiating authority. By this point, the rice-import issue no longer was 
"whether or not" but "when" and "how much."
Final-Phase of the Negotiations 
   The Bush years ended with a standoff with the Japanese side on the subject 
of rice imports, with Washington standing firmly behind its "no exceptions" 
position and Tokyo doggedly continuing to seek preferential treatment on rice. 
The new Clinton Administration trade team, working against the backdrop of 
the looming deadline for wrapping up the Uruguay Round multilateral 
negotiations, moved aggressively-both in style and substance-to resolve the 
issue. When he met Clinton at a bilateral summit session on April 16, Miyazawa 
recited the standard Japanese script, that tariffication of rice would require 
changing the Food Control Law, which would be impossible. Instead of 
responding with the American "no exceptions" argument, as Bush had done 
repeatedly, Clinton chose to avoid a harsh response.
   The multilateral negotiations revived in May when a quadrilateral (US, 
Canada, Japan, EC) Trade Ministers' meeting agreed to open comprehensive 
negotiations in the fall, a decision which intensified pressure on Japan to face 
and force resolution of the rice problem.
The O'Mara-Shiwaku Connection 
   An American initiative provided the catalyst for advancing the rice 
negotiations to the final stage. In June 1993, Charles J. O'Mara, Chief Agri-
cultural Negotiator in the Department of Agriculture, arranged a meeting with 
his counterpart in the Ministry of Agriculture, Shiwaku Jiro, who held the post 
of shingikan.20 Shiwaku and others in the Agriculture Ministry believed that 
with tariffication and free competition in the domestic Japanese rice market, US-
grown rice would be at a serious disadvantage to rice grown in Thailand where 
labor costs were significantly lower. Shiwaku thought, as had proved to be the 
case with wheat, nation-based set amounts of imports would be more advan-
tageous to the US than an open market approach. Agriculture Ministry officials 
also thought that the Clinton Administration, being more interested in results-
oriented, managed-trade than devotion to free trade ideology, would be recep-
tive to applying the wheat precedent to resolution of the rice issue on a non-
tariffication basis. Shiwaku ran this argument by the US side, which listened.
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After all, thanks to a decade of preferential import treatment, compliments of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, half the wheat sold in Japan was American-grown. 
   The US side did more than listen. In June 1993, O'Mara submitted a com-
promise draft proposal to Shiwaku which suggested deferring tariffication on 
rice for six years, during which period rice would be imported into Japan 
according to a "minimum access" formula. In a personal interview," O'Mara 
confirmed the accuracy of reports published in the Japanese press regarding his 
private meetings with Shiwaku, including the fact that the overture was an 
American initiative. According to the formula which O'Mara submitted, tarif-
fication of rice would only begin in the year 2,000, after the six-year "minimum 
access" period. 
   Joe O'Mara's plan, which allowed Japan to avoid immediate tariffication of 
rice, was a welcome surprise to the Japanese team. "It was more than we 
expected," was the reaction of one delighted Japanese negotiator.22 
   In July, Agriculture Ministry officials assembled to review the O'Mara draft. 
The bureaucratic lineup and relatively receptive thinking of officials in the 
ministry continued even through the domestic political chaos of mid-1993, the 
end of the 38-year reign of the Liberal Democrats, and the beginning of a series 
of multiparty coalition governments. Despite the tumble of domestic political 
events in Japan, these were the officials whose views mattered most in 
determining the Japanese side's negotiating position. These officials promptly 
decided to accept the American draft. 
   On the other hand, the Liberal Democratic Party politicians ready to accept 
rice liberalization a year before, when their party was in power, had become 
members of the "opposition." Now they were unfettered by concerns about 
shouldering the burden, and the blame, associated with making a decision to 
open the rice market. 
   The American side was closely monitoring the dramatically changing 
internal political environment, with an eye to the implications these changes, 
particularly the Liberal Democrats' fall from power, would have on Japanese 
negotiating policy. Had the Liberal Democrats altered their earlier stance ? 
Accordingly, in early August, American trade officials invited Iwakura Guzo, a 
savvy agricultural affairs specialist and long-rims party staff official, to 
Washington to learn the "opposition" party's thinking on the subject of rice. In 
the meeting, O'Mara asked Iwakura how the Liberal Democrats would respond to 
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the draft proposal. (note telephone interview with O'Mara, May 1996) "Even 
though we're the opposition party now, we'll respond by putting national 
interests first," was Iwakura's reassuring reply-whish O'Mara and the Amer-
icans interpreted to mean the party would support, or at least not oppose, the 
compromise plan." 
   In August, as Japan commenced emergency imports of foreign rice, Ministry 
of Agriculture officials secretly approached the Rice Millers Association. That 
meeting brought yet another surprise to the Japanese side, as RMA officers 
expressed their willingness to go along with the deferred-tariffication approach. 
In fact, following their discussion with the Agriculture Ministry representatives, 
the RMA sought Department of Agriculture guarantees on rice imports to Japan. 
   Thus, by the beginning of September the two sides had crafted the basis for 
an agreement on rice, a compromise arrangement which seemed acceptable to 
the most vociferous American lobbying protagonist and to the principal 
antagonists in the Japanese ministries and political parties. Meanwhile, the 
indefatigable Shiwaku continued to toil in the trenches an the details of an 
accord, for the most part side-by-side with his American counterpart O'Mara. 
From September on, Shiwaku-who reportedly had "virtually complete" nego-
tiating authority over the rice issue,24 was abroad, engaged in discussions in 
Washington and Europe. He met secretly at a small hotel in France with O'Mara, 
used a rental car, but did not use a pager or cellular phone. No record of these 
meetings appear in the Gaimusho records ; only a small number of Agri-
culture Ministry officials were aware the meetings were in progress.25 
   The Shiwaku-O'Mara meetings focused on several specific issues, including 
coming up with an acceptable translation far the key word "yuuyo"-which 
means "postponement" or "delay." Shiwaku balked at this English translation, 
favoring more ambiguous language. In the end the problem was averted 
through a circumlocution. The two officials also dealt with details on handling 
the period after the "minimum access" framework terminated following six 
years ; and the exact percentage amounts of imported rice to be set far the six-
year "minimum access" period. The Dunkel draft had sat forth a staggered 
percentage increase of 3 percent (year one) to 5 percent (year six). Japan pushed 
for the Dunkel figures, the US countered with percentages twice as high (6-10 
percent over six years). In the end, the sides landed squarely in the middle, 
agreeing on a 4-8 percentage formulation.26 
   His task virtually completed, Shiwaku returned to Tokyo on October 10. He 
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and O'Mara had worked out a mutually satisfactory arrangement which 
achieved Washington's goal of accessing the Japanese rice market and met 
Tokyo's desire to avert immediate tariffication. The final deal : in exchange for 
raising the amount of rice imported under the "minimum access" formulation 
(beyond the original Dunkel percentages), Japan won postponement of tarif-
fication until the year 2000. Thus, the US initiative of mid-1993 (the O'Mara 
plan) proved to be the breakthrough in the negotiations on rice, providing the 
Japanese side with a face-saving path of retreat.
   The negotiated deal had several pluses : it met the minimum acceptable to 
the central player (the US) ; it seemed to meet the expectations of Japan at the 
Uruguay Round ; it would, for a time, postpone resolution of the still politically 
iffy matter of rice tariffication ; it committed Japan to a rice import structure 
which other rice importing countries would follow ; it entailed a politically and 
economically manageable process of step-by-step increases in imports ; and it 
only required Japan to import comparatively modest amounts of rice.
   The final compromise solution made sense, but would it survive the 
formidable political obstacles in Japan? Of the many obstacles to rice liberal-
ization that Japanese officials and politicians had listed repeatedly before and 
during negotiations (see "The List" above, pp. 5-6), several were rooted in hard 
political reality. One was the Diet resolution on self-sufficiency in rice, which 
remained in effect and which was taken seriously as a commitment, Another 
constraint stemmed from the long-term and unchanged public statements of 
many politicians and political parties opposing the importation of a single grain 
of rice, much less tariffication. The chief barrier to winning acceptance of the 
compromise draft, one which caused the premier to be "tied up in a rope" 
(ganjigarame),27 was disagreement within his governing coalition serious enough 
to threaten its continuation in power. Hosokawa's whopping 70 percent public 
support rating obscured his government's inner frailty ; his popularity did not 
translate into the political clout to force opponents in his multi-party 
government, especially on a subject as touchy as rice. The coalition was not 
unified on rice liberalization. Hosokawa himself supported liberalization and 
had told associates he would open the rice market." At the same time, in a 
conversation with a top policy advisor a month earlier, he expressed the opinion 
that Japan should not liberalize rice without getting something in return. "if 
Japan can get conditions attached to liberalization, we should do so." 29
After his meeting with Clinton in New York in September he stated Japan's
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commitment to the December Uruguay Round deadline. Ozawa Ichiro, a 
Nakasone-esque political weathervane, former Liberal Democrat of the Tanaka-
Takeshita factional line, from a major rice-producing prefecture of Iwate in 
northeastern Japan, was a born-again reformist willing to accept rice liberal-
ization. His party, the Japan New Party, consisted mostly of breakaway Liberal 
Democrats. Komeito, another coalition member party whose support centers on 
urban constituencies, accepted liberalization. To persuade the New Party 
Sakigake to join the coalition, Hosokawa had promised its leader Takemura 
Masayoshi (also a former Liberal Democrat), that the coalition would oppose 
tariffication of rice." Because the compromise plan offered deferred tariffication, 
some analysts reasoned, there was technically no breach of Hosokawa's pledge to 
Takemura. Some hard-liners in Ozawa's New life Party (Shinseito) also 
staunchly opposed tariffs, but Ozawa seemed able to contain his troops and kept 
them in the party and the coalition. 
   In his late-stage efforts to hammer out a consensus in his coalition on the 
compromise rice-imports plan, Hosokawa's most daunting challenge came from 
the socialist. Although political reform was the pivotal issue to the Socialist 
party-as it was to all parties during 1993, the rice issue was highly volatile as 
well. Socialist party leaders had stated repeatedly their willingness to bolt 
Hosokawa's coalition rather than accede to a decision allowing rice imports. One 
illustration of the extreme reaction the inflammable rice problem elicited in 
Japanese politics, was that the same Socialist leaders even spoke of forging an 
alliance with conservative Liberal Democrats after their party had left the 
coalition.
   Contrary to conventional wisdom, the socialists were as dependent on rural 
district support as the Liberal Democrats, a support base whish party leaders 
desperately wished to maintain. As late as the first week of December, the 
socialist leadership clung to an anti-liberalization line and even called for 
additional debate on the topic in the Diet. The Socialist, known for nearly four 
decades as a party in perpetual opposition, were still playing that adversarial 
role-to the point of posing hostile queries about the state of the rice 
liberalization negotiations directly to the prime minister on the Diet floor. In the 
end, the negativistic politics of the Socialists left them out of the loop, the odd 
men out in contributing to the resolution an the ride-imports issue.
   However irrelevant the Socialists may have been to the negotiating process 





   In mid-October GATT Director General Peter Sutherland trekked to Tokyo 
where he spent two exhausting days trying to convey to Japan's leaders the 
urgency of the imminent deadline for finishing up the Uruguay Round. During 
his stay he conferred with bureaucrats, Liberal Democrats and Socialist party 
leaders who, to a surprised and exasperated Sutherland, seemed determined just 
to state Japan's unrelenting commitment against rice imports and to recite from 
"The List" (e. g., "Japan's cultural heritage," "Japan's food security imperatives"). 
Perhaps because he was less used to Japanese-style arguments on the issue than 
were the Americans, Sutherland reacted with surprise, and even astonishment. 
The Japanese leaders he met seemed indifferent to the fact that agriculture was 
but one of 15 other major negotiating group topics at the Uruguay Round, and 
that the Round included other topics such as trade-in-services and intellectual 
property rights that he expected would have been of concern to his Japanese 
hosts. Aside from leaders of Keidanren, who were "the only people I could talk 
to," he noted in a sarcasm-laced statement to the press, "the only thing anyone 
seems interested in talking about is rice." "They seem to think rice imports mean 
the end of the world," he went an, "but it are not."" 
   Sutherland's comments had repercussions. Far instance, once the outspoken 
Sutherland had left town, Hosokawa felt compelled to reassure the press that, "I 
told him [Sutherland] Japan would not accept tariffication." 32
"Final" Final-Stage Events 
   The prime minister's defensive and evasive public statements stemmed from 
the tightrope he was walking in domestic politics. Caught between his own 
preferences and stated commitments and his die-hard political opponents, 
Hosokawa was frustrated and cautious. He also was pessimistic about the 
usefulness of continued Japanese stonewalling. He told one coalition party 
leader that Japan's merely saying "we oppose, we oppose" ("hantai, hantai") will 
"not work." 33
   The hostile political and press backlash to reports of his remarks led 
Hosokawa to avoid comment on the subject. He fended off a barrage of 
questions on the Diet floor concerning rumored Japanese compromises with such 
comments as "such reports haven't reached me," or "you can't believe every story 
you hear," or "diplomatic negotiations should be handled secretly." 34 His 
disclaimers aside, former GATT Secretary General Dunkel in Tokyo for a 
conference, commented that there were no major differences between the 
secrecy-shrouded compromise plan and the overall draft plan, a statement
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which substantiated the rumors being circulated."
Thousand Times, No"
   Another Sutherland remark while in Tokyo had later repercussions and may 
have affected Japanese handling of negotiations during the final month of the 
process. In November, Minister of Agriculture Hata Eishiro decided to travel to 
Europe for a week of meetings with Sutherland and EC trade officials. His last-
minute trip apparently was inspired by an ambiguous remark Sutherland had 
made during his eventful stay in Japan the month before. While in Tokyo, 
Sutherland had confessed, "What I want is an agreement. As long as the 
involved countries agree, even if they want to say white is black, that's all right 
by me." 36
   Thus, even as the terms of the final agreement seemed settled upon, the 
Japanese side still was grasping at straws that might somehow improve rice-
related provisions of the accord. Sutherland's remark was such a straw, one 
which Japanese leaders seized upon as a possible opening to be exploited.
   Whether or not Sutherland's ambiguous remark had actually prompted 
Hata's final-hour foray to the other side of the world, the Agriculture Minister's 
goal was clear enough. His approach : "Having already swallowed the stick, we'll 
try to make it lees painful." 37 By "less painful," Hata seemed to have in mind an 
improved deal for Japan, one which would postpone rice tariffication to some 
unspecified future time instead of beginning the process in the seventh year, as 
the then existing compromise plan required.
   In Tokyo, Hosokawa's launched a preemptive strike against opponents of 
the compromise plan. Aware that a domestic backlash might jeopardize chances 
of an agreement, Hosokawa turned to two veteran Foreign Ministry officials, 
Sate Yukio and Owada Hisashi, who then dealt with Agriculture Ministry 
bureaucrats. Agriculture officials virtually never met with the prime minister 
himself at his residence over this period."
   Hosokawa's near-obsession with secrecy and worries that the rice problem 
might spill over to affect the US-Japan relationship itself spurred him to ask the 
Americans (through Ambassador Walter Mondale) not to make the rice import 
topic an issue at the upcoming APEC meeting in Seattle. Apparently, the US side 
appreciated Hosokawa's precarious position and agreed to downplay the subject 
at the November summit." The APEC meeting went as expected, with the rice 
issue given the low-key treatment arranged beforehand. 
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   Hosokawa returned to Tokyo where he began arrangements far a final 
round of consultations among his party allies in the coalition. His personal 
choice for undertaking this delicate task was Ogura Kazuo, Economic Bureau 
Chief in the Foreign Ministry. Perhaps Ogura had instructions to be especially 
tight-lipped in his comments and especially narrow in his circle of briefing 
contacts. Perhaps not. In any case, he did not touch base with farm lobbying 
organizations. Moreover, his briefings to the politicians and officials he did meet 
covered only information already published in the newspapers.
   Hosokawa was certainly using his best spin-doctoring skills to obscure what 
had really been happening in the final stage of the negotiations on rice imports. 
Just a week before the Uruguay Round ended, Japanese government officials not 
only were denying reports of a compromise settlement but were asserting, in 
fact, that Tokyo was still engaged in final-hour attempts at somehow might 
improve rice-import-related terms in the document. As late as December 9, days 
before conclusion of the Uruguay Round was announced, Hosokawa himself 
publicly rejected reports of a final agreement.
   The Japanese leader's claim strained credulity. One person who responded 
publicly about Hosokawa's statement was the ever-quotable GATT Director, 
Peter Sutherland. Sutherland, who was obviously quite aware of the facts, 
seemed unable to resist likening Hosokawa's remark to "calling `white' `black'." 40 
   Nor did the prime minister's claims do anything to reassure skittish 
Japanese politicians. From that point until the December settlement, the frantic 
maneuverings of Japanese politicians from that time until the December 
agreement did not stem from their concern with a foreign audience or with 
influencing the negotiations. Their target was domestic, namely, their electoral 
constituents and party rivals. At the same time, no politician seemed willing to 
go up against the international "system" ("taisei") with Japan isolated in 
opposing a standard set by the international community."
   The vast majority of Diet members of all parties were on record as having 
deemed rice liberalization to be "inevitable." A sizable minority had declared rice 
tariffication to be "unavoidable." These same politicians were now frantically 
scurrying about, seeking refuge from being held accountable for the reported 
Japanese concessions on rice. Most politicians blamed the bureaucrats. Liberal 
Democratic politicians blamed the Hosokawa coalition. Ironically, it was the 
liberal Democrats that Iwakura had assured O'Mara and other American 
negotiators some months earlier would put the national interest first. In the
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crunch, it seemed, his party colleagues were less interested in acting on that 
belief by lending their support to a beleaguered prime minister and the 
negotiated compromise plan than they were in political jockeying for political 
advantage in advance of possible elections and pledging unaltered loyalty to the 
"no foreign rice" slogan
.
   Politicians hoped to demonstrate that they had exerted sufficiently "great 
efforts" and had tried their best, albeit in a losing cause. By the same token, 
government leaders' ex post facto statements are properly viewed as merely 
damage-control tactics to minimize the potential political impact or what were-
to Japanese minds-wholly unsatisfactory final terms. A mere handful of 
politicians stood behind Hosokawa (and the vaunted "national interest"), willing 
to shoulder the risks and responsibilities associated with supporting the final 
agreement.
   Events between December 1992 and December 1993 merely furthered 
previous trends toward Japanese acceptance of the inevitability of compromise 
on rice imports. Apart from the factors discussed above, one should mention the 
1992 shortfall in Japan's domestic rice crop and subsequent decision to import 
rice from several countries on an emergency basis.
   Of course, the Japanese government's decision to settle the rice problem 
stemmed from other reasons and incentives. At the same time, the emergency 
rice imports undermined yet further whatever credibility remained in the 
Japanese side's adherence to the principle of national self-sufficiency in rice. 
Japanese representatives' attempts to rationalize these as "one-time only" 
purchases were ineffectual." Some Japanese leaders feared that, in the wake of 
the emergency rice imports, the Japanese side would be criticized for hypocrisy 
and opportunism if were to continue to stonewall an the compromise agreement. 
The emergency importing of rice was merely one more factor leading the 
Japanese government to realize the hopelessness of its defensive, watch-and-
wait negotiating approach.
   Only after seven years of haggling had Tokyo relented, grudgingly, 
incrementally, minimally, to a strings-attached settlement. Japan's behavior 
during the rice negotiations was consistently self-centered, narrow-minded, and 
parochial. In light of that dismal bargaining record, it seems ironic, indeed, that 
when announcing their decision to accept the final agreement, Japanese leaders 
explained the decision as motivated by Japanese devotion to free trade 
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principles, dedication to the GATT process, and commitment to fulfilling their 
nation's responsibilities as a global economic power.
SUMMARY ANALYSIS
   What does the rice case suggest about "Japanese style" 
international negotiations?
of conducting
Negotiating Structure and Process 
   Centrality of the Bilateral Process. The heart of the negotiating process in 
both cases was bilateral. Bargaining over rice imports (quota-based and 
tariffication-based) began at the bilateral US-Japan level. Subsequently, even 
while farm product issues were addressed multilaterally at the Uruguay Round 
trade negotiations, the process axis on rice continued to be the US-Japan 
connection. Final resolution of the rice issue was achieved via negotiations 
between the two governments within the structural umbrella of the Uruguay 
Round. 
   Japanese diplomacy buffs refer to such bilateral-in-a-multilateral-
framework interactions as "maruchi-bi." In the rice example, the critical process 
level was clearly "bi" with not much "maruchi"-type impact until an impending 
global trade accord provided isolation-conscious Japanese leaders with a final-
hour incentive to accept the previously arranged US-Japan compromise 
formula. 
   US side plays "Offense." The American side played the "offensive" role : 
Washington established the bargaining agenda, issued direct and indirect 
threats, undertook the significant initiatives, set the deadlines and, at the multi-
lateral lever, acted to mobilize other governments to buttress its negotiating 
stance vis-a-vis Japan. 
   Japan Plays "Defense." In sharp contrast, the Japanese played a "defensive" 
role : Japanese negotiators did not frame the initial bargaining agenda, but 
reacted within the framework of a US-dominated bargaining agenda and 
process. Its proposals were counter-proposals. Its conditions ware attached as 
strings to accepting American demands. Its bargaining game plan was executed 
upon an American playing field-with an American rule book, American 
referees, an American scorekeeper, and an American crew adjusting the height of 
the goal posts. No matter at which level negotiations took place-bilateral, multi-
lateral, or bilateral within multilateral-the policies, approach, and behavior of 
Japanese negotiators were conditioned by Japan's defensive position.
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   This is not to say the Japanese were passive, for they ware actively engaged 
in the bargaining process. Their active involvement in the process, however, 
took place in an externally-defined context. Their initiatives were not designed 
to replace or fundamentally alter the existing, made-in-America negotiating 
agenda. Throughout negotiations on rice, the Japanese negotiating team was in 
the position of reacting and adapting to other governments notably the 
American government's-initiatives, proposals, statements, demands, pressures, 
and expectations.
Strategies and Tactics 
   In interviews with the author, several Gaimusho officials have described 
Japanese bargaining strategy as "a strategy of no strategy." While few in 
number, perhaps, compared to other countries, there were Japanese bargaining 
strategies and tactics-shaped in form and nuance by the Japanese defensive 
orientation described above. 
   For analytical purposes, the strategies and tactics that were adopted and 
pursued by the Japanese side during the rice negotiations can be arranged into 
two general types : "issue-avoidance" and "issue-minimization." 
   "Issue Avoidance"Behavior. The Japanese government's fundamental goal in 
the rice case was not to enter into negotiations on the issues in the first place, 
Accordingly, a variety of "issue-avoidance" techniques were used, to block or 
defer consideration of what to the Japanese side were off-limits subjects from 
the bilateral and/or multilateral agendas. A sampling of the behavior drawn 
from the rice example : 
    • Gaining prior understandings or promises (through personal meetings 
      with American officials) that the topic would be off-limits or that Japan 
       will receive exceptional, special, or preferential treatment ; 
    • Seeking to "multilateralize" negotiations, thus sidestepping the US and 
       averting action ; 
    • Adopting a watch-and-wait posture at the multilateral level ; 
    • Blocking and/or delaying multilateral-level action in GATT panels based 
       on unanimity rule : 
    • Using available tools to demonstrate Japanese side's commitment to its 
       basic stance (as against stressing techniques to persuade others to 
      change their positions) ; and 
    • Repeatedly maintaining subject(s) as "off-limits" (tariffication-based 
      imports). 
   "Issue Minimization" Behavior. Once "avoidance" efforts had failed, the 
Japanese side turned to ways to reduce the scope and content of compromises
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required to resolve the issues involved. These are a few illustrations from the 
rice negotiations : 
    • Conceding less significant items (e. g., wheal and dairy products, tomato 
       paste and the like in these cases) to minimize concessions on more 
      important items ; 
    • Offering minor concessions and postponing further compromise until 
       American response received and assessed ; 
   • Avoiding explicit pledges ; and 
    • Expressing Japanese proposals in ambiguous language (notably during 
      preliminary and early-phase).
Domestic Institutions and Politics 
   Decision-making in Japan's political culture requires the expenditure of 
enormous energy and time in consensus-building tasks. Only by a politically-
correct process extensive discussions, behind-the-scenes consultations, formal 
and formal conferences-can a viable decision be arranged. According to 
Japanese norms of politics, all relevant opinions must be heard and be taken into 
consideration when reaching policy decisions. Japan's fractious, fragmented 
political processes extend to international negotiations and shape Japanese 
bargaining style in direct ways. 
   Non governmental actors. The extensive involvement of non-official actors 
an both sides reflects the diversity, complexity, and intensely interrelated 
quality of relationships between the two societies. In the rice case the Japanese 
negotiators' nemawashi efforts included a visit to Rice Millers Association offices 
to test the waters on the final compromise plan. 
   Similarly, the many missions, delegations, and personal envoys dispatched 
to the US were nemawashi-type tactics employed for domestic political reasons. 
These visits facilitated the softening of the Japanese stance and thus were a 
critical part of the process of reaching final agreements. 
   Manipulating "Outside Pressure." In the rice case, various Japanese official 
and non-official actors used external pressure-real, imagined, expected, and 
typically American-to provide added support for policies they personally 
espoused but might not have been able to accomplish without a dash of gaiatsu. 
   Time-consuming policy making process. In the rice case, the Japanese side 
typically took two to three months to prepare and present its positions at the 
negotiating table. The lengthy response time did not stem from intentional 
delaying or stalling tactics by the Japanese side but from the snail-like pace of 
consensus-building toward lowest-common-denominator decisions among all 
parties having a stake in the issues being considered.
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   Japanese news media and negotiating secrecy. The Japanese newspapers' 
relentless pursuit of "scoops" and information make bargaining secrecy difficult. 
Newspaper and magazine reporting an the Uruguay Round focused almost 
exclusively on rice, prospects for rice, problems with rice, foreign demands on 
rice, foreign leaders' statements on rice. 
   If details of private discussions (e. g,, the Shiwaku-O'Mara rice-related 
conversations during 1993), can be kept from the press the domestic decision-
making process is smoothed considerably, which, in turn, may help produce a 
politically sustainable final agreement. Given the fiercely combative political 
environment and a scoop-driven army of Japanese journalists, Hosokawa (like 
any Japanese leader) performed a balancing act. On the one hand, his secretive 
approach seems to have allowed the O'Mara-Shiwaku talks to achieve results 
that publicity might have nullified. On the other hand, keeping details of the 
final compromise plan from the public (and some domestic parties) even after the 
deal had been negotiated left him vulnerable to political attack when terms of 
the final agreement became known.
Attitudes and Perceptions 
   One Issue-ism. Japanese negotiating behavior on the rice issue, and 
particularly its role in the Uruguay Round bargaining process, was molded 
consistently and heavily by the extraordinary weight of the topic of rice 
liberalization in the Japanese mind. It is no exaggeration to say that the 
Japanese viewed the Uruguay Round process through a rice-clouded lens. In 
Japanese eyes, concluding the Uruguay Round meant an avalanche of foreign 
rice into Japan. The Japanese newspapers freeze-dried their reporting on 
Uruguay Round happenings to a simple question : what about rice? 
   This preoccupation with the single and, to Japanese, non-negotiable subject 
of rice had repercussions on Japanese negotiating conduct. For one thing, the 
mindset virtually ruled out objective policy debate on the topic. Rice liberal-
ization was a taboo topic, even at the highest levels of the Japanese government, 
until negotiations neared completion. 
   Only by appreciating this Japanese outlook on the topic can one explain the 
otherwise baffling intensity of the Japanese side's efforts-at each stage and at 
both the bilateral and multilateral levels-to explain Japan's situation, gain 
special treatment for Japan's rice sector, and escape compromise, on a matter of 
peripheral consequence to all but a few other governments. Many foreign critics 
and government officials were both bewildered and unconvinced by Japan's 
one-dimensional negotiating performance at the Uruguay Round.
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Japanese Compromise Behavior 
   Beyond a rock-hard commitment to its minimum position, what was 
acceptable to the Japanese side turned on what was acceptable to the Americans. 
Japanese concessions were seen as giving up less of what the Americans were 
asking, rather than winning more from the Americans. 
   What prompted Japanese concessions in these two cases? Significant 
Japanese compromises (final-stage) were offered only when circumstances 
surrounding negotiations had become heavily politicized, a "crisis" stage had 
been reached, and the Japanese side had come to see itself to be in a "no-choice" 
position. 
   A significant, final-stage, source of pressure to concede was multilateral. If 
there was unanimous agreement, the possibility of being isolated, criticized, and 
blamed for the collapse of the Uruguay Round was very real. Japanese fears of 
American retaliation for non-compliance with its proposals (and consequent 
threat to other, relatively more, significant sectors of the Japanese economy) 
constituted another major, final-stage, reason for Japanese compromise. 
   The apparent Japanese sense of relief when Washington dropped its more 
ambitious demands (e. g., its demand for immediate tariffication of rice imports 
in mid-1993) seemed to make the Japanese side more willing to accept earlier 
American proposals it had rejected. In what must be a uniquely Japanese way of 
rationalizing compromise, Japanese final concessions in both cases were justified 
because they permitted a final agreement with better terms than those 
Washington had been demanding earlier! 
   In light of the actual, as against stated or indirect, reasons why the Japanese 
side accepted the minimum-access-cum-deferred-tariffication formula, it 
therefore made little, if any, difference which single party or coalition of parties 
happened to be heading the Japanese government when the final-stage decisions 
were reached in the fall of 1993.
American Bargaining Style as a Factor 
   Japanese Complaints. At various times during the years of negotiating agree-
ments on rice, Japanese negotiators and officials complained about Washington's 
negotiating conduct. Among these alleged American shortcomings were the 
following : 
   (1) unannounced shifts in position ; 
   (2) unexplained, sudden escalation of demands ; 
   (3) discrepancies between American positions expressed at multilateral 
       level and those taken in bilateral meetings ; 
   (4) violation of previous Japanese-US "understandings" or "promises";
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   (5) excessive use of pressure and threats ; and 
   (6) repeated submission of demands known to the American side as "off 
       limits," clearly beyond Japan's maximum concession range.
   Impact on the Negotiations. The escalation of American demands in both 
cases clearly imposed added hardships on the consensus-driven Japanese 
domestic decision-making process, making the process even more time-
consuming. American shifts in position during negotiations had similar effects. 
   Such American behavior had a particularly striking impact on the Japanese 
side's conduct of the negotiations, precisely because Japan's bargaining "menu" 
was provided by the US. When the American side changed or added items to 
that agenda, the existing Japanese internal consensus disintegrated. Tokyo then 
had to arrange a fresh consensus, more or less from scratch, on the basis of the 
latest US plan. 
   Aside from these domestic political effects, what impact did such American 
behavior have upon the Japanese side? One example : in the case of mixed-
signals sent to the Japanese from different officials on the US side, Japanese 
negotiators, always on the alert for any sign of softness on the Americans' part, 
would seize upon the most conciliatory among the statements received (e. g., 
Ambassador Mansfield's remark that he "understood" Japan's refusal to import 
rice") and use them in subsequent talks with US negotiators as supporting 
evidence for the Japanese position. 
   While Japan was not able to effectively exploit these conflicting messages 
from the American side to its advantage, the frequently different and 
occasionally contradictory messages added static to the communication process. 
Whether the US demands were artificially inflated (i. e., "phony") or not, their 
later withdrawal affected the bargaining process (by hastening settlement 
between the sides) and the final outcome (by improving final terms an favor of 
the US side). However loudly and often Japanese officials cried foul over this 
violation of bargaining norms by the Americans, from the US perspective the 
tactic (if it was, in fact, intentional of submitting and then retracting especially 
harsh conditions was an effective tool. Why the American "ploy" worked so well 
is explained, again, by Japan's place in a fundamentally defensive bargaining 
structure and by the Japanese side's view of its position within that framework 
as weak, vulnerable, and necessarily reactive. (see above "reasons for Japanese 
compromise") 
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   Japanese bargaining style in the rice case is "classic." The "style" mirrored 
the "coping" or "go-with-the-flow" approach described earlier. Japanese nego-
tiators sought, to the greatest extent possible, to avoid losses, to limit damage, 
and to avoid mistakes. Their bargaining behavior in these instances fits one 
American observer's apt likening of Japan's diplomatic style to that of "an 
interested bridge partner, waiting to follow the first goad bid from the American 
side." 4' 
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